Transcript
some brand new research from Forescout's Videri Labs. That research is called Anatomy of a Hacktivist Attack, Russia-Aligned Group Targets OT and ICS, which is a very wordy title, but it's some really interesting research and we thought it deserved its own little broadcast. So I'm joined by my colleague Michele Campobasso from Forescout's Videri Labs and we're going to talk about what this research actually means. As you'll have noticed from the title, yeah, we're talking about a hacktivist group attacking operational technology, OT or ICS, which certainly isn't the first time we've seen this kind of thing happen, but there's something very specific about this particular OT slash ICS. What is that, Michele? Yeah, the peculiarity of this attack is that we were the ones that were attacked or one of our honeypots. So yeah, we basically ran a number of honeypots here at Forescout and we noticed something. We decided to investigate and yeah, indeed, there was a defacement of an HMI system that simulates a water treatment system, which was claimed from a group of activists on Telegram claiming the attack, that they subverted the system, they took control of the water treatment plant and stuff like that. If the system was real, they could have caused some damage, but it was just a simulation actually. It actually illustrates a really important point, doesn't it, about hacktivism in general is that we do have to take those kinds of claims with a grain of salt, because very often, they may be outright false, just lies. They might be co-opting data from prior hacks and republishing it and packaging it as something else, or they might be claiming, and I'm pretty sure this won't be the first time this has happened, although I can't recall any specific publications about it, claiming attacks on fake infrastructure, like one of our honeypots as, what did they claim as, how did they describe it? Do you remember? In general, so this group is a group, or was, and we will come to that later, a group of activists that are pro-Russia, so their modus operandi and the decisions of targeting someone falls into attacking companies, organizations that are against Russia right now, or that are somewhat, for example, into NATO or Ukraine, with the intent of disrupting, for example, the systems that may support that country. And one interesting bit of this group is that we saw for, it's very infrequent to see that those attacks are not like data leaks or ransomware attacks, but they are specifically focusing on critical infrastructure, on OCS systems, on SCADA systems. So that was quite peculiar to see, to notice that bit. So what activities did they specifically carry out when they were inside the honeypot? How did that unfold? Yeah, so basically they found this HMI, which was set there with just default passwords, with default credentials, was exposed to the internet, and so they easily guessed the passwords and then quickly found some exploits for the vulnerable version of that HMI. So they basically, yeah, run, it was an XSS on the web server running the HMI, and then decided also to remove the, change the administrator's password, create a new account that they were using to control the HMI, disrupted completely the logic of the plant, and modified some of the threshold values that would raise an alarm. So if that was the case of an actual attack, that would have been something potentially bad if they didn't use the XSS, probably would have even got unnoticed to our production system unless they were protected with some other network monitoring products. So yeah, it could have been quite devastating if it was something real. Yeah, so there was the defacement, which was the real giveaway, is what you're saying? Yeah, yeah, that's what that was. And if that defacement hadn't happened, then those more serious implications may well have gone unnoticed until, until what? Until, I don't know, some valves maybe broke or something exploded in the plant. I don't, I don't know exactly. But real world, yeah, yeah, exactly. I mean, they were, they were maneuvering actuators and sensors that have to do with physical systems. In our case, they were simulated, but they were actually connected with some PLCs. So there was actual hardware that was acting on nothing. But in a real industrial scenario, that could have caused some damages. Right. Okay. Yeah. And, and so the claim, I know the defacement mentioned someone called Barlatti. Yeah, that's right. But you've also tied it to a group called Tunet. So let's talk about that a little bit. Who or what is Barlatti? Who or what is Tunet? Yeah. So Tunet is, as I mentioned before, is, is a group of pro-Russian activists, Barlatti allegedly is one of their members and, and they both do their claims on Telegram. This activist group appeared, I think, about a year ago or less than a year ago, actually. Yeah. Beginning of this year, right? January. Yeah, it was January. It was January. And of course, as, as happens very, very often in this kind of situations, accounts get deleted and then reappear and then get deleted and then reappear. So the last channel was recreated on the 14th of September and the attack happened on the 15th or the 16th, something like that. So they decided to, to, to get back in operation and to claim again their attacks. And what we see in that group is a number of things. Before they were mostly focused on DDoS in general. Now they started to shift their operations against attacking ICS and SCADA systems. There was also some, some forwarding messages from allegedly affiliated groups. There were even messages forwarded from an alleged author called Desinformador Russo, which stands, which means Russian disinformer in Spanish and checking online. It turns out that this, if, if the person actually matches the handle, the person writing those blogs or whatever, they were leaking the information about militaries from NATO and Spain. It might be someone that is on the most wanted fugitive lists from Europol is a Spanish professor. We don't know if this is the actual person, of course, or maybe just someone using the same handle. But that's interesting to see nonetheless, because it's still within the line of being aligned with the pro-Russia propaganda within the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. And there was, there was more activity on the channel, right? So you said the OTICS targeting seems to be a new direction for them. So prior to that, it was DDoS as a service? Most likely. So DDoSing, intimidation, signal boosting other groups as well, right? Cross-boosting. Yeah, that's correct. Is it fair to say, do you think that that signal boosting stuff, the cross-posting of other hacktivist and threat actor groups is an attempt to effectively signal boost themselves to get attention from other people? Absolutely. Yes. Yes. Yes, I think so. And this is a very recurrent theme across the Telegram ecosystem, mostly in the hacktivist, let's say, threat landscape, where you see a number of channels of people that claim and build relationships, sorry, partnerships across different groups to signal boost themselves and have a bigger mass of messages and showing that, hey, we do this, we participate into that. So they grow somewhat reputation to be fearful or to be dangerous, which to some extent they actually are. I'm not saying that they, it's just, it's just signal boosting for nothing. But it's credibility, it's followers, it's public persona and that kind of stuff, right? Because at the end of the day, one may just forward messages, but once after a while, they may decide maybe to get in touch with those, with these alleged partners and actually create partnerships. And that is the case of some affiliated communities, as we were saying on TwoNet, there were those messages being forwarded and you can follow the breadcrumbs to arrive to other groups. And all of a sudden, you will, all of a sudden, after a while, you will stumble upon some groups that are more long standing, they have bigger, bigger user bases, if you want to call them like that, show more activity in general. And there were... The center of gravity in that ecosystem, right? With other groups and actors orbiting around. But actually speaking of other actors, there was another persona, it wasn't just Barlatti, right? There was... Yeah, yeah, there was this... Who is Dark Warriors and what's the significance of that persona within this? Yeah, Dark Warriors in the TwoNet community or group was another person conducting attacks. And interestingly, was one of the few that was advertising himself as a provider of camera hacking as a service or similar other attacks of no particular technological sophistication, honestly, but still, it can be interesting. It was still non-traditional devices, right? Not just IT stuff. Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. So more on the OT niche, per se, and yeah, it was providing services. This is something that I didn't see often in those groups where actually their only goal is to do the attacks rather than advertise themselves as providers of something. And there's a couple of other groups mentioned, I suppose that refers back to what we were talking about, the groups that are a center of gravity and then the groups that orbit around them, to stretch the metaphor a little bit. And some of those that are mentioned in the report are, let me test my memory, Overflame and... Yeah, Overflame. Cyber troops. Yeah. So Overflame... What's the interrelationship there? Yeah. So basically, it all starts with TwoNet forwarding messages from, if I recall correctly, Overflame, which once I landed basically on their channel, I saw very often messages of them creating partnerships with other groups. The recurring theme there as well was that they are pro-Russian groups. So there was like a constellation of about 20 groups that I could count, honestly, alleged affiliations, as I said. And it appeared kind of a hub of different groups and activist communities joining forces together under the same flag, although there were small differences. There was a group that I can remember, like Mr. Hamza, that was a pro-Palestinian group, which doesn't really match exactly the narrative of the bigger group. But who knows exactly what is the kind of relation that they decided to build upon. Maybe there's a crossover of methodology, if not ideology, maybe. Yeah. Yeah. In a way, yes. Because you can see also that there were reported cases of hacks that they did. Most of the times they were DDoS, but they were not limited to ICS, SCADA and NoT systems as well, where they do joint attacks. So Overflame claims to have done this attack together in cooperation with Group X. I don't know what name right now. So it is interesting because the moment you see a group like that, that is able to create alliances and to be able to conduct operations jointly with other groups, you can see that as a way of sourcing different expertise that you may not have in-house, the bigger group like Overflame, for example. They may not be experts in a specific domain, so they decide to work together with someone else. And that is interesting because it creates then relations within them, because at the end of the day, those are people. And even if a channel is taken down or they may decide to terminate operations, people do not disappear. They still... Yeah, and the relationships remain, right? Yeah, exactly. They don't decide all of a sudden to disconnect from the Internet forever. They keep on doing those things. They may not decide to turn into, I don't know, a completely different kind of business. So it's very interesting to see where momentum builds up and see what are the potential offsprings of those groups. It mirrors the developments we've seen, if you think about it, like traditional financially motivated cybercrime over the past 20-odd, nearly 30 years. It mirrors the developments where the ecosystem kind of splinters into specialist providers where you've got people who are doing testing, people who are creating the code, people looking for vulnerabilities, people selling initial access, people doing funding, people doing testing. I mean, people money mulling, cashing out, whatever it might be, right? There's a niche vendor for every service. It sounds like we're kind of seeing that same development in sort of the hacktivist sphere as well. Yeah. It's big because, again, we are seeing this building interest, which is right now looks like more politically motivated, at least for this very example that we're looking at. It looks more politically motivated than anything or ideologically motivated. There are other communities that are building, that are gaining popularity. One of them is VCOM, that is like a big umbrella term that covers several groups, very heterogeneous. But among the big names, we can see Lapsus, we can see Scatter Spider, we can see Shiny Hunters. So the thing that we speculate about, we don't know as of yet, we as researchers, we speculate about the possibility that those groups of small hacktivists that start to have a taste on different subjects, on different matters, they may do like a school here. They learn how to do things, they get a taste, they get a grip on the subject. And then once they build enough, let's say, reputation or expertise, they may move to the bigger players. And it's very fascinating from a point of view of understanding the human dynamics behind all of this. It's why are those people doing those things is for a number of reasons. So it's an interesting shift moving from being economically motivated, financially motivated towards more human related kind of drivers. And we cannot just limit our understanding to technical TDPs right now. We really need to understand how those social networks work to be there when things happen. We cannot just be reactive, I think. It's funny you mentioned experience when you've been talking about, you know, they work, they gain exposure, experience and so on, because this isn't the only hacktivist related stuff that we've picked up in honeypots over time, right? We've seen and we've seen it in various different guises from the more experienced actual tampering that we saw in the 2Net hack when they were actually modifying parameters and causing kinetic changes in equipment, or they would have been, to, you know, we saw some other some other stuff that was, I think, came out, at least on an infrastructure level, came out of Moldova, I think, if I remember correctly, and we saw some other stuff that came out of Iran and that appeared to be less sophisticated. What were the indicators that tell us that? So they basically were mostly playing with some of our PLC, so more with the hardware of it. They were mostly playing with Modbus and they were trying to play with the protocol. I don't believe they made a lot, they did mostly scanning and they tampered a bit, the PLC honeypots. They were using basically off the shelf penetration testing tools like Metasploit. It was interesting to see, though, that was there were several sources, actually, it was a coordinated kind of exploration here. There was some reconnaissance and then there were some further reconnaissance, more tailored to the technical, to the hardware of our honeypot. And yeah, they looked like they did, they played a bit with that. But the interesting bit probably is that they were coming from different IPs. It looked like somewhat of a coordinated kind of effort from a number of people within the same group. Right. And there was no tooling and there was no, they didn't seem to have a particular agenda to the activity. It was more kind of browsing, clicking around. Yeah, exactly. So it's more of a probing and maybe figuring out what is this technology, which goes again on the theme that they do not necessarily aim to do something specific with that technology. They maybe don't know that technology yet and they land on that and they started looking at it and they decide whether it's worth or not to go on. That is also the case for another tag that we saw where another couple of IP addresses logged in in very short sequence on still the same honeypot. And what we saw there is that someone logged in immediately after just run a script to obtain remote code execution on the PLC, on the HMI, sorry. Whereas the other IP address instead took a way more manual approach. They stayed on the honeypot for like 10 days, something like that. And they were playing around with interface, looking at things, not really doing anything. They were really changing little parameters, but they weren't doing anything that would have caused any issue to our physical system if there was any there. So that tells that maybe that was not interesting enough. Maybe they understood it was a honeypot or maybe they didn't have enough skills to work into the system. And this goes, again, in the direction that we don't have to think that everyone is an APT, even those that are, especially those that are attacking SCADA or OT is not all of them is not APT. There can be damaging things even done from people that have very little understanding what they have in front of them. So in a nutshell, what's the what's the value of this kind of like the honeypot approach and the research that comes out of it? What's the value of that to you as a researcher and to the to the community in terms of what it generates? Yeah. So what we learned from here is that we now have even more access to some of those groups and activist groups. We see what is being reported already from the industry and academia that social interaction matters a lot when when when monitoring those those kind of activities is not just technical TTPs. If we want to build a solid understanding of how the threat landscape works and how it can evolve over the course of time, we need to be really there. We need to understand how the social dynamics among these people occur and and be able to to be when the next big thing is is is going to happen. We can follow them more closely. We can understand what drives them. We can be able to forecast in a way what is going to be the next big thing, because those people love to brag about things. Well, you know, when you talk about people bragging about things, for me, that's something important that also comes out of this is that when you think about, yes, we had the first case that we spoke about, the two net case that was publicly claimed and publicized by the threat actor. But from the other stuff that we've spoken about, I think it's really important to remember that not all activity, even successful, nominally successful activity, even though it was a honeypot, not all activity is broadcast. So we have evidence of, quote unquote, successful intrusions into OT and ICS that no one has claimed responsibility for and that have never been broadcast. So we can't rely on the fact that we see relatively to other kinds of cybercrime, low level of intrusion in OT because there is going to be an awful lot of it that is not broadcast and never surfaces. And we have the evidence for this about this on our honeypot. We saw several attacks that have gone unclaimed, even more damaging attacks, if you want, or more sophisticated in a way. The XSS is just a way to brag, it's a defacement. Defacement is more of a kind of writing graffitis in a way. So, yes, lots of them go unnoticed. So I think it's important to mention before we close, of course, this whole conversation relates to research, which you can go and check out on forscout.com slash research. And you can find all of our latest publications there. But as always, in all of these research documents, it's not just the research. We do include recommendations and mitigations for security practitioners. And in the case of this kind of attack, they are things like making sure that you eliminate weak authentication, remove default or easily guessable passwords, for example, particularly on OT ICS devices. You can enforce strong, unique passwords where that's supported, although that's less often across that kind of infrastructure. Don't expose your stuff directly to the Internet. If you do expose it, if you need to for operational reasons, then make sure it's secure behind VPN gateways or very strict V-landing and ACLs. Segment rigorously the network, separate IT, IoT, OT networks, limit network connections to any specific devices, harden admin interfaces, anything that is exposed, and monitor those segments, monitor those devices. But make sure that you're using IoT and OT aware deep packet inspection technology, because standard IT stuff is going to tell you everything's fine because it doesn't understand half of what it's seeing. And make sure that you keep an eye on outbound attacks and potential dual use things. I mean, we spoke about IoT devices earlier on when we were talking about Dark Wario. Things like IP cameras already have been and will continue to be abused in other kinds of attacks and have become a valuable resource in the underground. Michele, I want to thank you so much for the work you've done on this report and for joining us today to talk about it. And for you people watching, I hope you've enjoyed that quick chat. And don't forget, go and check out the research on Forescout.com slash research and join us for another broadcast in the future. Thank you. Thank you, Rick. Bye bye, everyone.